Relatives\u27 Support Liability: Two Years after Kirchner by Jones, James G.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 18 | Issue 3 Article 17
1-1967
Relatives' Support Liability: Two Years after
Kirchner
James G. Jones
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
James G. Jones, Relatives' Support Liability: Two Years after Kirchner, 18 Hastings L.J. 720 (1967).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol18/iss3/17
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
an additional amount which will satisfy litigation costs, attorney's fees
and the compensation award."
Akzra Togasaki*
56 This would be statutory additur (or mcrescitur), McCouvncK, DAMAGEs 82
1935), which would set a lower limit upon the amount of damages equal to the com-
pensation award, reasonable attorney's fees and costs of litigation.
* Member, Second Year Class.
RELATIVES' SUPPORT LIABILITY: TWO YEARS
AFTER KIRCHNER
[The parents, grandparents, and the children of] evene poore, olde, blinde, lame,
and upotente Person, or other poore Person not able to worke, being of a suf-
ficient Abilitie, shall at their owne Charges relieve and mamtame every such
poore Person, in that Manner and according to that Rate, as by the Justices of
Peace of that Countie where such Persons dwell shall be assessed I
This ancient poor-law statute of England was substantially adopted as Cali-
forma Civil Code section 206.2 However, the state's cause of action cannot be
predicated upon the above section alone.3 The California Welfare and Institutions
Code establishes liability of financially-able responsible relatives for persons who
have received aid from the state.4 This liability applies not only to relatives of the
indigent, but of the aged,5 the feeble-minded, 6 or the mentally-disordered. 7 This
note will deal with relative's liability for the support of the mentally-disordered.
Section 6650 of the Welfare and Institutions Code imposes joint and several
liability on the husband, wife, father, mother, or children, their estates and the
estate of the mentally-ill patient for the expenses of a patient's support and
maintenance in a state mental hospital. In most ]urisdictions the courts have con-
strued similar statutes to require that the state seek compensation first from the
inmate hunself.5 California courts, however, have consistently construed section
1 An Act to Relieve the Poor, 1597, 39 Eliz. 1, c. 3, § 7; see tenBroek, Californmis
Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, & Present Status, 17 STAN. L.
REv. 614 (1965).
2 CAL. Civ. CoD § 206 provides: "It is the duty of the father, the mother, and
the children of any poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain
such person to the extent of their ability "
s County of San Bernardino v. Simmons, 46 Cal. 2d 394, 296 P.2d 329 (1956).
4 Ibid. See CAr.. WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE §§ 12100-01.
5 CAL. WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE § 12101.
6 CAL. WELF. & INsr'Ns CODE § 5250.
7 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6650.
8 See, e.g., State ex rel. Cromwell v. Panzen, 76 Idaho 211, 280 P.2d 1064 (1955);
State v. Bryan, 105 Kan. 483, 185 Pac. 25 (1919); In re Rhodes, 196 Wash. 618, 83
P.2d 896 (1938).
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6650 and other sunilar California support statutes to allow the state to seek
compensation first from certain relatives of the inmate. 9 The validity of the stat-
utes under this construction had been consistently upheld by the Califorma
courts10 until the cases of Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley" and De-
partment of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner.'2
This note will examine Hawley and Kirchner and the subsequent cases con-
strmng them. It will be shown that the careful examination of mental health
support liability required by the Hawley and Kirchner decisions, while not re-
suiting in sweeping changes in California support law, has produced a construction
of that law which brings California more closely into line with the law of other
jurisdictions.
Hawley and Kirchner: Holdings and Issues
Hawley held that the father of a person confined in a state mental institution
pursuant to the administration of the criminal law was not liable for hIs support
and maintenanceTh The court emphasized that:
the committed person is held in the state institution not merely because he is
(or was) insane but because the state, in a proceeding instituted by it, has ac-
cused hia of crime and his detention is found to be necessary for the protection
of the public. The fact that here the accused has been found presently insane
does not provide a valid basis for sustaining a charge against a person not other-
wise liable.14
Because of the emphasis by the court on the cnimial character of the case, the
decision had only a limited practical effect.
In Kirchner,'5 however, the reasoning of the Hawley decision was carned over(
into involuntary civil commitment. The state sought reimbursement under section
6650 of the Welfare and Institutions Code from the estate of an adult daughter
for the expenses of her mother's care and maintenance in a state mental hospital.
It was established at the trial that the mother had an estate adequate to meet the
expenses of her own support, but the trial court held the daughter's estate liable
9 See, e.g., Department of Mental Hygiene v. Black, 198 Cal. App. 2d 627, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1961); Department of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvery, 50 Cal. 2d 742, 329 P.2d
689 (1958); Guardianship of Thrasher, 105 Cal. App. 2d 768, 234 P.2d 230 (1951);
State Comm'n in Lunacy v. Eldndge, 7 Cal. App. 299, 94 Pac. 597 (1898).10 See, e.g., Department of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvery, 50 Cal. 2d 742, 329 P.2d
689 (1958) and County of Los Angeles v. Fnsbie, 19 Cal. 2d 634, 122 P.2d 526 (1942)
where attacks were based on asserted lack of procedural due process; and County of
Los Angeles v. Hurlbut, 44 Cal. App. 2d 88, 111 P.2d 963 (1941) and Kelly v. State
Bd. of Social Welfare, 82 Cal. App. 2d 627, 186 P.2d 429 (1947) where the attacks
were based on certain limited claims of discriminatory classification.
1159 Cal. 2d 247, 28 Cal. Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22 (1963).
12 60 Cal. 2d 716, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720, cert. granted, 379 U.S. 811
(1964), remanded for clarification on jurisdictional grounds, 380 U.S. 194, clarified,
62 Cal. 2d 586, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321 (1965).
13 Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 59 Cal. 2d 247, 28 Cal. Rptr. 718, 379
P.2d 22 (1963).
14 Id. at 255, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 723, 379 P.2d at 27.
15 60 Cal. 2d 716, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 388 F.2d 720 (1964).
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for the expense of her mother's support.1 On appeal the right of the state to
statutorily impose liability on one adult for the support of another adult com-
itted by the state to a mental institution was challenged as a denial of equal
protection. 17 The court found the statute to be arbitrary since it allowed the taking
of the relatives' assets without first seeking reimbursement from the estate of the
inmate.18 The opinion cited Hawley with approval, emphasizing that the purpose
of both criminal and civil commitment was the protection of the public from the
confined person and his eventual "reclamation as a productive member of the
body politic." 19 Thus the court said that
the cost of maintaining the state institutions, including provision of adequate care
of its inmates, cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class in the society; such as-
sessment violates the equal protection clause.20
There are three common factors in both Hawley and Kirchner:
(1) the person sought to be charged was not otherunse liable for the support
of the inmate, apart from the mental health support statute;21
(2) the state had mitiated the commitment proceedings and not the person
sought to be charged with liability;
(3) to some extent both commitments were for the purpose of protecting the
public.
Now the question is whether it is necessary that all these factors coexist in order
to apply the Hawley and Kirchner rules to a particular case. Stated in positive
terms, the inquiry is whether underlying liability, voluntary commitment or a
purpose broader than protection of the public will enable the state to impose
liability on responsible relatives. This question is answered in recent cases22
which have narrowed Hawley and Kirchner.
The Construction of Hawley and Kirchner
In County of Alameda v. Kaiser23 the county sought to recover the cost of
medical aid rendered at the defendant's request to her eighteen year old son. The
16 The trial court apparently relied on Department of Mental Hygiene v. McGil-
very, 50 Cal. 2d 742, 329 P.2d 689 (1958), which held that relatives were uncondi-
tionally liable under § 6650 of the Welfare & Inst'ns Code.
17 Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 718, 720, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 488, 489, 490, 388 P.2d 720, 721, 722 (1964).
18 Id. at 722, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 492, 388 P.2d at 724.
19 Id. at 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 490, 388 P.2d at 722.
20 Ibid.
2 1 In Hawley the father was not othermi'se liable because relatives have no support
duty for adult kindred who are confined by the state for purposes of trial or punishment
pursuant to the criminal process. Thus, but for the commitment to a mental institution
pending trial and the mental health support statute there would have been no grounds
for seeking the father's support of his adult son. In Kirchner the only possible under-
lying duty of support was section 206 of the Civil Code. However, it was clear that
the mother was not indigent because she had an estate sufficient to meet the expenses
of her maintenance by the state.
22 All of the cases save one were decided by the California District Court of Ap-
peals, 1st App. Dist., Div. 1.
28238 Cal. App. 2d 815, 48 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1965).
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defendant claimed that her son was an adult and that under Kirchner she would
not be liable. The court distinguished Kirchner by holding that the boy was a
minor and upheld the defendant's liability24 under the Welfare and Institutions
Code.25 In so doing the court stressed the fact that the parental support of a
minor child is a well-settled common law obligation which has long been statu-
tory in California and which as not an unreasonable classification in violation of
equal protection of the law.26 This underlying liability apart from the Welfare
and Institutions Code provision as another factor which distinguishes the case from
Kirchner. However, it was further pointed out that "the element of confinement
for the protection of society from the mentally-ill, present in Kirchner, is not a
factor here."27
Although the facts of Kaiser are totally dissimilar to Hawley and Kirchner,
the law of the cases s fully compatible. Thus in Kaiser, as distinguished from
Hawley and Kirchner, there was a voluntary commitment, underlying liability,
and no purpose to protect the public.
In In re Dudley2S the three factors present in Kaiser were more carefully
weighed. The state sought reimbursement, under section 5260 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code,29 from a mother for the expenses of care furnished her adult
daughter in a state home for the mentally-deficient where she was placed at her
mother's request. The court, in narrowing the Hawley and Kirchner principle,
said "the law properly requires contribution, within his ability to pay, from a
person otherwise responsible for the care of a mentally-deficient person."3 0 The
court carefully noted that an Kirchner the state attempted to predicate liability
solely upon section 6650 and was not successful because the defendant's liability
would not have existed absent the statute.31 In Dudley the state sued for reim-
bursement under section 5260 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and was
successful; notwithstanding section 5260 the defendant was otherwise liable
under section 206 of the Civil Code because of the indigency of the daughter.82
While underlying liability was the main factor used to distinguish Kirchner, the
Dudley court did not hesitate to also point out that the inmate was voluntarily
committed.3 3 Thus Dudley, as Kaiser, imposed liability where there was under-
lying liability, and a voluntary commitment.
The importance of voluntary or involuntary commitment was repudiated an
County of Alameda v. EspinosaO4 where the court held that it did not violate due
process or equal protection to impose liability on a father for the expense of
maintaining ins son in a state mental hospital when placed there by order of the
24 Id. at 817-18, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
25 CAL. WErLF. & INS-NS CODE § 17300.
26 238 Cal. App. 2d at 817-18, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 345; see CAL. Civ. CODE § 196,
206, 207.
27 238 Cal. App. 2d at 817-18, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
288239 Cal. App. 2d 401, 48 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1966).
29 Now CAL. W=. & INST'NS CODE § 5250.
30 239 Cal. App. 2d 401, 403, 48 Cal. Rptr. 790, 791 (1966). (Emphasis added.)
81 Id. at 412, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
82 Id. at 409-10, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
33 Id. at 412, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
84243 A.C.A. 685, 52 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1966). /
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juvenile court.35 Recognizing that Kaiser and Dudley involved voluntary com-
mitments, the court said that this factor cannot be controlling.8 Instead the court
suggested that the true test is whether there is a primary purpose to protect the
public or a primary purpose to rehabilitate the individual when the state commits
the inmate.3 7 If the state does commit a person primarily for the purpose of
protecting the public, relatives of that person, although they have an underlying
liability of support, cannot be required to pay the expenses of his care.38 How-
ever, the court said that when a person is "confined for the dual purpose of pro-
tection of the public at large and his reformation and rehabilitation .,;9
relatives, if otherwise liable, can be charged for the expenses of his care.40 It
appears that liability will be imposed whenever there is a purpose to rehabilitate,
unless that purpose is combined with a primary purpose to protect the public.
Thus the Espnosa court allowed the state to recover from a relative who had an
underlying support liability even though the commitment was involuntary since
the commitment was found to be for the purpose of rehabilitating the inmate.
Hawley was distinguished because it involved an involuntary commitment pri-
marily for the purpose of protecting the public,41 and Kirchner was distinguished
because it involved no underlying liability.42
The reasoning of Espinosa was further substantiated in Department of Mental
Hygiene v. O'Connor's where the state sought to recover from the estate of a
husband, the expense of maintaining Ins wife in a state mental institution.44 In
holding that Kirchner did not apply and that the husband's estate was liable, the
court emphasized that in the present case, as in Dudley, the person sought to be
charged with financial responsibility was liable for the support of the incompetent
notwithstanding the statutory liability under section 6650. 45 As the court pointed
out, the nature of this underlying liability arose from the voluntarily contracted
marriage and was "not only historic but statutory."48
85 Id. at 700, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 489; see CAL. W=-F. & INsT'Ns CODE § 903 which
provides: "The father, mother, spouse, or other person liable for the support of a minor
person, the estates of such persons and the estate of such minor person, shall be liable
for the cost of his care, support and maintenance in any county institution in which
he is placed, detained, or committed pursuant to the order of the juvenile court
The liability of such persons and estates shall be ]omt and several liability."
36 243 A.C.A. at 695-96, 52 Cal. Bptr. at 484-85.
37 Ibzd.
38 Id. at 690, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
89 Id. at 700, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 489. (Emphasis added.)40 The court apparently did not consider the clear language of Department of
Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 490, 388 P.2d 720,
722 (1964) where it was said: "Whether the commitment is incidental to an alleged
violation of a penal statute, as in Hawley, or is essentially a civil commitment as in the
instant case, the purpose of confinement and treatment or care in either case encompass
the protection of society from the confined person, and his own protection "
41243 A.C.A. at 697-700, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 487-89.
42 Id. at 694, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
-3246 A.C.A. 12, 54 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1966).
44 This action was based on CAL. WELE. & INST'Ns CoDE § 6650.
45 246 A.C.A. at 16, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
46 Id. at 15, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 434-35; see CAL. Civ. CoDE § 174.
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Conclusion
It is clear that all cases which have construed Hawley and Kirchner have un-
posed liability on a relative for the expense of supporting a person incurred by a
state institution when an underlying liability for support of that person has been
incorporated into various California statutes.47 When such a liability exists, a
valid class discrimination is permitted, and the state by statute can constitutionally
extend such liability to cover the expense of maintaining a person in a state hos-
pital for the mentally-il. The rule apparently is that unless a person is held for
the primary purpose of protecting the public, as in a criminal proceeding, the
state is entitled to reimbursement only if the person sought to be charged has an
obligation of care and support apart from that imposed on hun by the mental
health support liability statute.
Kirchner does not declare that all liability under section 6650 of the California
Welfare and Institutions Code is unconstitutional. 48 The section is invalid only
insofar as it was interpreted as imposing liability on those who would not for
any other reason be liable for the support of the inmate. Absent a special rela-
tionship, a relative would not be liable for the support of an adult inmate unless
that inmate were indigent.49 Except in the cases of parent-child and husband-
wife, primary support liability apparently rests on the inmate himself or his
estate, and all other relatives are only secondarily liable. This result brings
California law on mental health support liability closer to the interpretation given
to similar statutes by a majority of jurisdictions.50 Although this is not a sweeping
change in California support law, it does to some extent satisfy early criticisms of
the law51 and partially fulfills the re-evaluation of support liability envisioned by
the Kirchner court.52
James G. Jones*
47 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 174, 196, 206.48 This was expressly recognized in Department of Mental Hygiene v. O'Connor,
246 A.C.A. 12, 14, 52 Cal. Rptr. 432, 434 (1966).
49 Where the adult inmate is indigent, § 206 of the California Civil Code would
provide the necessary underlying liability. See In re Dudley, 239 Cal. App. 2d 401,
48 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1966).50 See, e.g., cases cited note 8 supra.
51 See, e.g., State Comm'n in Lunacy v. Eldndge, 7 Cal. App. 299, 307, 94 Pac.
597, 600 (1898) (Chief Justice Beaty dissenting); Department of Mental Hygiene v.
McGilvery, 50 Cal. 2d 742, 762, 329 P.2d 689, 703 (1958) (dissenting opinion by
Justice Schauer).52 Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 722, 36 Cal. Rptr.
488, 491-92, 388 P.2d 720, 723-24 (1964).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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